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Abstract 
This study examines the effect of credit risk and liquidity 
risk on the potential increases in systemic risk of the banking 
sector in four ASEAN banks. Two systemic risk measurements, 
namely dCoVaR and MES, are used in order to evaluate the effect 
of credit risk and liquidity risk on systemic risk of individual bank 
(dCoVaR) and systemic risk when the market is in distress (MES). 
The result from the regressions shows that credit risk and 
liquidity risk significantly affect systemic risk at the market 
distress. Meanwhile, credit risk and liquidity risk do not affect 
systemic risk of individual bank. The crisis affects systemic risk is 
showed by two regressions which are conducted in four ASEAN 
banks. The result is interesting because when the regression is 
conducted for all the countries, there is a positive and significant 
effect of crisis on systemic risk in four ASEAN banks, but when it 
is conducted for each country (as an additional analysis), not all 
the countries are affected by the crisis. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Bank is an institution that is vulnerable to 
the financial and macroeconomic condition 
due to its function as the fund collector and 
distributor in the financial system (Hadad et al., 
2003). Therefore, the bank default will affect 
the financial system that can lead into domino 
and systemic effect (Acharya, 2010; Patro et al., 
2013). Lo (2008) mentioned that systemic risk 
could not be eliminated, where systemic events 
would give the negative effect to the financial 
market and economy (Patro et al., 2013), and 
also would cause bank closures by the 
monetary authority (Arena, 2008).  If the 
financial institutions experience the default 
altogether, systemic risk will appear as the 
impact of this situation (Rodrigues-Moreno et 
al., 2010). 
Empirically, systemic risk can be 
measured by delta Conditional Value at Risk 
(dCoVaR) (Girardi and Ergun, 2013), Marginal 
Expected Shortfall (MES) (Acharya et al., 2010), 
Component Expected Shortfall (CES) 
(Banulescu and Dumitrescu, 2012), and 
Systemic RISK Measure (SRISK) (Acharya et al., 
2012). Girardi and Ergun (2013) explained 
dCoVaR as the difference percentage of CoVaR 
when the bank is in distress to the one when it 
is not. Acharya et. al. (2010) explained that MES 
corresponds to the bank expected equity loss 
when market falls below a certain threshold, 
5%. Banulescu and Dumitrescu (2012) 
explained that the CES quantifies each bank 
contribution to the overall risk adding the 
capital weight into the analysis. Acharya et al. 
(2012) explained that SRISK measured the 
expected capital shortfall of an institution 
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conditional on a crisis, using the size and 
leverage.      
Pierret (2015) had found the weakness 
of SRISK was the assumption of Book Value (BV) 
of the debt that was not changed for about six 
months even more in the crisis period, in this 
case, the result of the measurement would be 
useful just in short-term forecast. Banulescu 
and Dumitrescu (2012) mentioned that CES was 
developed from MES (Acharya et al., 2010) by 
adding the capital weight into the analysis but 
it still used the same main data source, i.e. 
market return. Banulescu and Dumitrescu 
(2012) claimed that CES was a hybrid measured 
to catch Too Big Too Fail (TBTF) and Too 
Interconnected Too Fail (TITF), where by using 
MES (Acharya, 2010), Lestari (2015) found the 
same result. Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012) found 
that dCoVaR was useful to catch contagion and 
balance sheet deleveraging in the banking 
system. Meanwhile, MES can be used to 
measure the bank resilience to the systemic 
risk in the moderate level (Idier et al., 2013; 
Weiβ et al., 2014). Yun and Moon (2014) used 
dCoVaR and MES and found that the result of 
the measurements were almost the same in 
term of cross-section dimension. This research 
uses dCoVaR (Girardi and Ergun 2013) and MES 
(Acharya, 2010) to measure systemic risk based 
on two methods approached.  
The purpose of this research is to discuss 
the effect of credit risk and liquidity risk against 
systemic risk in the developing countries 
banking sector in four ASEAN banks (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand). 
Developing countries are vulnerable to the 
crisis that happens in the developed countries 
(Goldstein and Xie, 2009). Bank becomes the 
main financial source of private business sector 
in Asia countries so the bank stability in this 
area becomes an important issue (Adams, 
2008). Moreover, the integration of ASEAN 
banks due to the ASEAN Economic Community 
in 2020 will increase the competition level 
(Matousek, 2015). The main contribution of 
this research lies on the usage of two systemic 
risk measurements associated with the credit 
risk and liquidity risk in four ASEAN banks.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Systemic Risk 
Patro et al. (2013) assumed systemic risk 
as likelihood from previous systemic events or 
financial system failures caused by systemic 
events that have negatively impacted financial 
markets and the economy. Separately, Lo 
(2008) explained that systemic risk is different 
from systemic failure. Systemic failure can 
occur or is not based on the strength of the 
event that triggers an increased risk, while 
systemic risk cannot be eliminated.  
 
The Factors Drivng Systemic Risk  
Credit Risk and Liquidity Risk 
Ahmad and Ariff (2007) examined credit 
risks in developing countries during the crisis 
and they found that Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand had 49%, 19%, and 48% of bad loans, 
respectively, which was calculated from the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. 
Credit risk can be served as a proxy for bank risk 
taking behavior considering the high credit 
ratio indicates aggressive behavior of banks 
which is an indication of bank risk-taking 
behavior (Hannan and Rhoades, 1987). On the 
other side, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) 
found that maturity mismatch in the 
commercial banks will lead on systemic risk. 
Maturity mismatch is the difference of asset 
maturity and bank liability that make a bank 
vulnerable to the higher risk (Ruprecht et al., 
2013).  
 
Competition and Bank Size 
Soedarmono et al. (2013) found that 
competition and bank size caused systemic risk. 
It happened because in the high competition 
level, small and big banks compete to each 
other in order to exist in the market (Hakenes 
and Schnabel, 2011). The higher competition 
level is the higher risk is taken by the bank 
(Cubillas and Gonzales, 2014). Besides 
competition, systemic risk can be affected by 
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bank size. Jonghe et al. (2015) claimed that 
combination of size and scope will give double 
effect on systemic risk. It leads to the Too-Big-
Too-Fail (TBTF) issues where the bigger th bank 
size is the bigger chance it has systemic risk 
(Lestari, 2015).   
 
GDP and Inflation 
Weiß et al. (2014) measured systemic 
risk in terms of systemic event trigger factors 
during financial crisis period. The main results 
were regulatory characteristics, GDP, and 
inflation dominantly affected systemic risk 
globally. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Analysis Unit 
Analysis unit in this research is the banks 
listed in four ASEAN countries (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) during 
2007-2013 periods. This research uses 
commercial banks regarding to its freedom in 
doing business mix and facing the limited 
boundaries between countries (Soedarmono et 
al., 2013). Banks without a complete data 
needed (stock prices and annual financial 
statements) for three consecutive years will be 
excluded from the sample (Ariss, 2010). After 
filtering the banks data, there are 34 banks 
listed in Indonesia and 11 banks are used, 10 
banks in Malaysia and 8 banks are used, 14 
banks in the Philippines and 11 are used, and 
10 banks in Thailand and 9 banks are used. The 
data is taken from Datastream Thomson 
Reuters. 
 
Methodology 
This research used dCoVaR and MES as 
the model because dCoVaR can be used to 
indentify systemic risk based on individual bank 
so it can catch TBTF and TITF issues (Bisias et 
al., 2012). This research follows Girardi and 
Ergun (2013) to measure dCoVaR that is 
described as the difference between CoVaR 
when the bank is in the distress period and the 
CoVaR in the normal period. Meanwhile, MES 
(Acharya, 2010) defined as banks expected 
equity loss when the market falls below 5%.  
 
Empirical Model  
1. Delta Conditional Value at Risk (dCoVaR) 
This research follows Ahmad and Ariff 
(2007) to count credit risk as bad loans 
percentage during three months or more to the 
total loans, Yun and Moon (2014) to count 
liquidity risk as the ratio of total loans to total 
deposit, and Girardi and Ergun (2013) to count 
individual bank systemic risk by using dCoVaR. 
Girardi and Ergun (2013) has described VaR 
bank i (i ≡ s is financial system) as q-th quantile 
from return bank distribution bank i that 
written by Rti : 
 Pr ≤ 	
,  =  (1) 
 
Then, dCoVaR i|jq,t is defined as q-th 
quantile from bank i return that is conditional 
to bank  j. dCoVaR i|jq,t can be described as VaR 
bank i that is conditional to market distress. 
Return bank i will be less than or equal to the 
VaR value when the market distress happens. 
 
Pr  ≤ 	
,
  ≤ 	
,  =  (2) 
 
Next, to count the percentage of 
dCoVaR, market VaR that is conditional to the 
bencmark bank j deducted from market VaR 
that is conditional to distress. The percentage 
of dCoVaR is counted as: 
 
	
,/ = 100(	
,
 − 	
,
  )
	
,/      (3)    
 
Conditional benchmark bank j bi can be defined 
as standard deviation from mean event: 
(µtj–σtj) ≤  Rtj ≤ (µtj + σtj)       (4) 
 
where, 
bi : Event when return bank j between µ–σ and 
µ+σ, i.e.  (µ–σ)≤R≤(µ+σ) 
 Rinda Sinaga: The Effect Of… 
 
 
4 
µtj: Conditional mean bank j 
σtj: Standard deviation bank j 
 
2. Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) 
This research follows Acharya (2010) to 
count MES that is described as expected equity 
loss when the market falls below 5%. 
 
"#$%% = −# '() − 1(* +,%%-      (5) 
 "#$%% =  −#  
where, ()(*  ∶ 01234 5	46 
 ,%% ∶ "	3601 301234 (371 	87 
 
Panel Regression Model  
1. Delta Conditional Value at Risk (dCoVaR) 
The first regression is done by using 
panel data to regress credit risk and liquidity 
risk against systemic risk of individual bank 
(dCoVaR) based on this model:  
 
dCoVaRi,t=α0+α1NPLi,t+α2LDRi,t+α3Sizei,t+α4GDPt
+α5Comi,t+α6Inft+α7Indt+α8Malt+α9Thait+α10Cris
t+ei,t          (6) 
 
where, 
dCoVaRi,t: dCoVaR bank i at t year 
LDRi,t:: Liquidity risk bank i at t year 
NPLi,t: Credit risk bank i at t year 
Sizei,t: Size bank i at t year 
GDPt: GDP at t year 
Compi,t: Competition bank i at t year 
Infit: Inflation at t year 
Indt: Country dummy at t year; Indonesia=1, 
others=0 
Crist: Crisis dummy at t year; crisis (2007-2009) 
= 1, others (2010-2013) = 0 
ei,t: Residual of the result  
 
2.   Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) 
The second regression is done by using 
panel data to regress credit risk and liquidity 
risk against systemic risk when the market is in 
distress based on this model: 
 
MESi,t=α0+α1NPLi,t+α2LDRi,t+α3Sizei,t+α4GDPt+α5
Compi,t+α5Inft+α6Indt+α7Malt+α8Thait+ei,t
             (7) 
 
where,  
MES i,t: MES bank i at t year 
LDRi,t: Liquidity risk bank i at t year 
NPLi,t:: Credit risk bank i at t year 
sizei,t: Size bank i at t year 
GDPt: GDP at t year 
Compi,t: Competition bank i at t year 
Infit: Inflation at t year 
Indt: Country dummy at t year; Indonesia=1, 
others=0 
ei,t: Residual of the result  
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
Table 1. Shows the statistic description of 
the data 
Source: Self proceed 
 
Based on the dCoVaR calculation in Table 
1., bank gives contribution to systemic risk for 
about 63% on the average. Meanwhile, based 
on the MES calculation, each bank gives almost 
3% (on the average) contribution to systemic 
risk. Generally, based on the data after dCoVaR 
is counted, it can be concluded that big banks 
in Indonesia, Philippine, and Thailand give 
more contribution to systemic risk. This finding 
is in agreement with another research finding 
by Jonghe et al. (2015) that the big bank 
contribution to systemic risk is bigger than 
Variabel 
Mean 
(%) 
Media
n (%) 
Max 
(%) 
Min 
(%) 
dCoVaR 63.82 59.87 229.9 2.201 
MES 2.837 3.023 7.264 0.061 
NPL 3.934 3.132 17.46 0.331 
LDR 94.04 95.18 211.2 31.44 
Size 712.9 720.5 824.4 575.9 
Com. 37.34 37.18 95.15 13.94 
GDP 494.3 487.3 535.2 465.1 
Infl. 2.672 1.288 1.151 -1.109 
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small banks. On the other hand, from the 
output of dCoVaR, it is also known an 
interesting finding that small banks in Malaysia 
give more contribution to systemic risk than big 
banks. Zebua (2010) explains that small banks 
will be able to give a bigger effect to systemic 
risk as the bank runs issue, especially in the 
crisis period.  
 
The Effect of Credit Risk and Liquidity Risk 
against Systemic Risk of Individual Bank  
The purpose of this regression is to know 
the effect of credit risk and liquidity risk against 
systemic risk of individual bank in four ASEAN 
banks. The regression is done to answer the 
first question of this research.   
 
Table 2. The Effect of Credit Risk and Liquidity 
Risk against Systemic Risk in Four ASEAN 
Banks 
dCoVaR C T-Stat Prob. 
C 
NPL 
2.642 
0.041 
4.230 
0.215 
0.000*** 
0.829 
LDR 0.012 1.025 0.306 
Size 0.013 1.18 0.238 
Com. 0.037 1.37 0.171 
GDP -0.508 -4.029 0.001*** 
Infl. 0.367 1.072 0.284 
Ind. 
Mal. 
0.296 
0.005 
4.074 
0.227 
0.001*** 
0.820 
Thai. 0.082 0.023 0.004** 
Crisis 0.054 3.144 0.002*** 
Adj. R2 50%   
*** Significant level 1%  **  Significant level 
5%; *Significant level 10% 
Source: Self proceed 
 
Based on the Table 2., it is known that 
credit risk and liquidity risk do not affect 
systemic risk of individual bank. However, it is 
known that crisis gives a positive significant 
effect to systemic risk at the 1% significant 
level. It is interesting because when the 
regression is done for each country (for 
additional analysis), only Indonesian banks 
showing that crisis affects systemic risk. It 
means that if the banks in four ASEAN banks 
are integrated in a single market area, the 
systemic risk will increase due to the crisis 
condition. Weiß et al. (2014) also found the 
same result that crisis gives an effect to 
systemic risk.  
Furthermore, it is also found that 
Indonesia and Thailand give contribution to 
systemic risk in four ASEAN banks but GDP 
gives a negative significant effect to systemic 
risk. It means that if the GDP decreases, 
systemic risk will increase. If the goods 
production decreases, the business profit will 
also decrease. It may affect the credit payment 
to the bank as the company usually borrows 
money from the bank. Adams (2008) found that 
bank was the main source of fund of the private 
business sector in Asia. That is the reason why 
the bank stability becomes an important issue.  
 
The Effect of Credit Risk and Liquidity Risk 
against Bank Systemic Risk at the Market 
Distress 
The second regression is done between 
credit risk and liquidity risk against systemic risk 
at the market distress. It is in order to know the 
effect of credit risk and liquidity risk against 
systemic risk especially under the market 
distress condition. 
 
Table 3. The Effect of Credit Risk and Liquidity 
Risk Against Systemic Risk at the Market 
Distress in ASEAN-4 Banks 
MES C T-Stat Prob. 
C 
NPL 
0.094 
0.050 
2.352 
2.385 
0.019 
0.018** 
LDR 0.007 2.424 0.016** 
Size 0.020 13.14 0.000*** 
Com. 0.005 1.535 0.125 
GDP -0.043 -5.558 0.000*** 
Infl. -0.093 -2.250 0.025** 
Ind. 
Mal. 
0.035 
-0.037 
7.331 
-15.41 
0.000*** 
0.000*** 
Thai. 0.003 1.074 0.284 
Adj.R2 62%   
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   *** Significant level 1%; ** Significant level 
5%;    
   *Significant level 10% 
   Source: Self proceed 
 
At the market distress, it is known that 
credit risk and liquidity risk affect systemic risk 
under 5% significant levels. It means that, if the 
crisis happens in four ASEAN banks, credit risk 
and liquidity risk will give a positive significant 
effect to the systemic risk. The result of this 
regression is interesting as when the regression 
for each country is done (for additional 
analysis), it is found that systemic risk in 
Malaysian banks are not affected by the credit 
risk and liquidity risk. It means that if the four 
ASEAN banks are integrated in a single market 
area, both credit risk and liquidity risk will 
affect systemic risk under the market distress. 
Moreover, it can be seen from the table 
that banks in Indonesia affect systemic risk in 
four ASEAN banks, while banks in Thailand does 
not show the same thing. Malaysian banks 
affect systemic risk in four ASEAN banks with 
negative correlation. It can be explained by 
looking at the result of MES calculation. Based 
on the calculation, banks in Malaysia show the 
lowest contribution (on the average) to the 
systemic risk compared with the other three 
countries. This is reasonable since Malaysia 
was less affected by the 2008 crisis and the 
Malaysian banks show a relatively good 
performance over the sample period. It can be 
seen from the credit ratio which is about 3.2% 
and the liquidity ratio which is about 95% over 
the sample period. 
 
CONCLUSION  
After all, the main result from this 
research is the greater possibility of systemic 
risk when banks of four ASEAN countries are 
incorporated in a single market area. Both of 
the regressions show that crisis gives a 
significant effect to the systemic risk. However, 
during the market distress condition, credit risk 
and liquidity risk give a significant effect against 
systemic risk.  
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